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ABSTRACT 
Foreign direct investment (FDI), reckoned as a major source of private capital, has grown 
phenomenally world wide in the last two decades. Developing countries receive about a thi rd 
of the global FDI inflows. Although developing countries vie for more FDI, selecting a 
country for locating investment depends on the decision of multinational enterprises (MNE). 
An attempt made in this paper to identify from the literature the theoretica l basis of foreign 
direct investment found it to be lacking. The literature emphasized more on the empirical 
findings of robust location determinants for understanding investment deci sion processes of 
the MNEs. It appears that countries' attractiveness improve with favorable determinants to 
influence MNE 's investment location deci sion. 
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/. INTRODUCTION: 
Foreign direct investment (FOI) is a major source of private capital in the world 
economy. In the last decade or so FOI has grown sharpl y worldwide, the growth rate 
of FOI outflow even surpassing that of the world exports (ADB, 2004). Most FOl 
originations and destinations, however, have been the developed countri es, including 
the United States and the European Union. While every developing country vies to 
get a share of the world 's FDl, about a third of it is received by the developing 
countries, most of which are in Asia. But even with in Asia, investors favor some 
countri es e.g. China, india, over others. Why investors go abroad, why investors 
favor some countri es but not others, what characteri sti cs of a country attract 
investors fo r locating FOI, and what host countries can do about to attract FOI 
location- have been the complex issues at the forefront of di scuss ions among 
researchers and policy makers for sometime. 
The purpose of thi s paper is to explore from a literature survey the attracti veness of 
the location factors for foreign direct investment by identi fyi ng motivations of the 
Multinational enterprises (MNE's) . A lot of insights can be brought into focus 
through a li terature rev iew of the theoretical and empi rical studies made in the past. 
The studies have generall y covered different aspects of FDr in the manufacturing 
sector. Though emphasis in most studies is on the manufacturing sector, and do not 
specifically deal with agriculture or food processing; the theoretical and empirical 
underpinnings of FOl serve both sectors equall y well as they are basicall y same for 
all sectors. 
In tryi ng to understand the complex ity of the FDr phenomenon, one should view it 
from the perspectives of demand and suppl y of investment capita l. From general 
economic viewpoint, supply of FOI is based on dec isions by the multinational 
enterpri ses (MNEs) to invest capital in pro fit making ventures in another country. 
Such investments can be in greenfield (new) operations, but in practice capital 
investments largely have been made through mergers and acquisitions, made with 
the primary intention of earning better rates of return for their investments. MNEs 
select appropriate host country locations with clear moti ves of rent seeking. The host 
country, on the other hand, needs private investment capital to help in its economic 
deve lopment. Developing countries parti cularly fi nd FOI as a source of pri vate 
capi ta l which can help in achiev ing their development objectives if invested in their 
countries . The MNEs as suppliers of investment capital, and recipient host countries 
as demanders, come together in the international market for investment with 
respecti ve self-interest. For MNEs the objecti ve is making pro fit , for host countri es it 
is getting private capital investment that bring them together into the FDl market. 
In contrast to the product market exchange, the decision of the supply-side MNEs 
gets priority in the choice of FDl location or sector. While the MNE's complex 
decision making process of selecting a particular location for FOI remains unkno,,'n 
as a business secret, there are certai n kinds of country attributes, or detern1inants, 
that are considered in the investment dec ision. As a private capita l suppli er the MNE 
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evaluates whether different attributes in the host country are appropriate for its 
investment. Like any business transaction , the foreign direct investment decisions are 
made by the MNE when its motivation for FOllocation favorabl y co incides with the 
host country's attractiveness of attributes. It is therefore appropriate strategy for the 
demand-side host country to know how to provide attractive attributes so that they 
may influence the MNE's decisions in favor of locating FOI in the country. 
Over the last three decades ex tensive research on foreign direct investment has 
generated a vast literature on the theory and empirics of FOt. The research on the 
theory is aimed at basically to understand why firms become multinational s and 
invest abroad , and what they look for in a country to locate their investments. The 
empi ri cal research on FOI, on the other hand, mostl y covers three major areas: (a) 
detenninants or factors of FDl inflows; (b) impacts of FDl inflows on the host 
coun tri es' economy; and (c) attracti veness of host country determinants in 
influencing location decisions of the multinational enterprises (MNE). The vast 
literature, by and large entailing (a) and (b), contributes to the conceptual 
understanding as well as empirical evidences of the FOI activities1 The literature on 
(c), though li mi ted, provides understanding of the host country factors in the light of 
attracting FOI. On the whole, the literature is expansive with substantive 
contributions on various complex issues relating to FDl, but it also abounds with 
many contradictions and conflicts that borders into confusion . Though the literature 
contains emphasis on the developing countries, there seems to be no straightfOlward 
objectives set for the developing countries. For the developing countri es to attract 
FOI location in the competitive market it would be helpful if they have c lear 
understandi ng of what attributes or factors would indeed draw MNEs' attention . 
The paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 presen ts a brief review of the 
current trends in FOI. Section 3 explores the motivation of the MNEs from 
theoretical standpoi nts basicall y to answer the questions: why a firm becomes 
multinational, why it goes abroad with FOI and what attributes of the country attracts 
them . Section 4 rev iews the literature to identify the determinants that influence FOr 
inflows into a host country. Section 5 provides MNEs' views on the factors that they 
find attractive for deciding FDllocation in a host country. The paper concludes with 
findings from the literature survey in Secti on 6. 
II . THE TREND OF FDI: 
In the last two decades world FDl has increased phenomenall y. Annual FDl inflows 
to both developed and developing countries have increased from $53 .7 billion in 
1980,to $1.4 trillion in 2000. Global FOI stock has also increased from $ 590 billion 
in 1982 to $ 8.2 trillion in 2000 (UNCTAD. 2004). World economic s lowdown since 
2001 has caused downturn in both FOI inflows and outflows. FDl inflows have 
declined since 200 I to $560 billion in 2003, but the prospect of upturn again is in the 
I This study concentrates on theory, location determinants of FDI and attracti \'eness afhost countries. 
Impacts ofFOI have not been included in this study. For literature surveys on the impacts ofFD I see 
Agarwat ( t980 ). De Mello (1997). Fan (2003) . 
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forecast (UN, 2004). Since 1996, FOI growth has overtaken the world exports 
growth and retained the leading position despite the downturn . 
Developed countries maintained lead ing position in both FOr outflows and inflows. 
In 2000, the peak year of FDI, developed countries provided 90 percent of the 
world's total FDI outflows, and received 78 percent share of the inflows. Out of the 
$1.4 trillion global FOr inflows, $1.11 trillion went to developed countri es. 
Developing countries received $253 billion or 22 percent of the global FDI inflows 
(UNCTAD, 2004). The share of FOr inflows to developing countries increased si nce 
1980. The average annual percentage of the FDI inflows to developing countries 
increased from 25 percent in the 1980s to 30 percent in the 1990s (Banga. 2003). 
This trend remained virtually unchanged even in the years when global FDI flows 
declined. 
The big sources as well as the recipients of For are also the developed countries. 
Europe and North America remained the largest source of FOI outflows, supplying 
more than 75 percent of the total FDI since 199 1 (ADB, 2004). Out of the $ 1.2 
trillion FDI outflows in 2000, the European Union provided $806 billion and the 
Uni ted States $ 143 billion. The European Union and the United States received the 
largest shares, $67 1 billion and $314 billion respectively, out of the $1.4 trill ion FO I 
inflows (UNCTAD, 2004) . 2 
The trend shows FDr inflows have ri sen in the developing country regions too. From 
the annual average of $ 11 9 billion in the 1992-97 period, FOr inflows to deyeloping 
countries rose to $252 billion in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2004). Among deyeloping 
regions, Asia was the recipient of largest FDI inflows, followed by Latin America. In 
2000, FOr inflows of $146 billion went to Asia and $98 billion to Latin America. 
The average arUlual For inflow into Asia and Pacific was about 54 percent of the 
total in the 1980s, which increased to 61 percent in the 1990s. Asia alone received 97 
percent in the 1980s, and 99 percent in the 1990s (UNCT AD, 2003). FDI inflows 
declined in later years, still Asia received higher inflows than Latin America while 
Africa and the Pacific regions received the lowest. 
The di stribution of FOr inflows within Asia is biased toward the East, South East. 
and South Asia regions. About 72 percent of the total inflows to Asia in the 1980s, 
and 97 percent in the 1980s, went to these regions. But again, the largest shares of 
total inflows went to few countries, while other countries of the regions rece ived 
very little. Four countries in Asia-China, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore together 
received on average 80 percent of the total FOr inflows to Asia during 1980-200 1 
(UNCT AD, 2003). All other countri es of the region received on average 0 t03 
percent of the total FOr inflows to Asia during 1980-2001. Total FDI inward stock 
received by the countries in the period 1980 to 2001 shows a striking picture. Three 
countries, China, lndonesia, and Singapore received 85 percent of the total FDI stock 
2 The observed discrepancy between the inflows and the outflows is the amount in the pipelino': and 
also sta tis tical. 
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during 1980-2001, whil e Thailand and Taiwan received abo ut 2 percent , and all 
others received less than I percent of the total FOI stock. 
Table I : FOI outflows and inflows by selected countri es/regio ns 
(Billions of dollars) 
I FO r outflow FDI inflow 
Region/Economy 1998 2000 2003 1998 2000 2003 
World 687 1186 6 12 69 1 1388 560 
Developed 63 1 1084 570 473 572 367 
Countries 
European Union 415 806 337 250 67 1 295 
North America 165 187 173 197 38 1 36 
U.S. 13 1 143 152 174 3 14 30 
Developing 53 99 36 194 252 172 
countries 
Asia 32 84 24 102 146 107 
Latin America 20 14 II 82 98 50 
Africa 2 I I 9 9 15 
Source: UNCT AD (2004), World fnves/menl Report, 2004, UNCT AD, Geneva 
The supply-side MNEs used vast majority of the FOI in cross-border mergers and 
acqu isitions (M&A). Greenfield investments (direct investment in new facilit ies, or 
expansion of existing facilit ies) ranged between $200 and $300 bill ion annuall y 
(MrGA, 2002). Greenfi eld investments that wou ld have impacted economic 
development were the target of the demand-side countri es. However, for their pari 
MNEs considered cross-border mergers and acqui sitions less risky than greenfi e ld 
investments. 
Increase of For in developing countri es accentuated due to various factors such as 
relaxed government restri ctions, privatizat ion programs, and trade liberali zation o f 
the FDI seeking countri es. In 2000 alone, 69 countri es made 150 regu latory changes, 
147 of which were favo rab le to FOr (Banga, 2003). Such promotional acti viti es by 
the demand-side countri es were intended towards influencing suppl y-s ide MNEs 
decisions, which paid off for some developi ng countri es though did not for others. 
As developing countri es continue to seek private capital through FOI , the overall 
demand for FOI will grow. But supply ri gidity will make it more and more 
competi tive. To be attracted for FDl locati on the deve loping countri es wi ll have to 
try harder with more and more of the three " I's"- incenti ves, instituti ons, and 
infrastructure to attract FOI (ADB, 2004). What of these ' I' s' are influential in 
attracting For needs to be evaluated . 
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Ill. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF FDI: 
Why manufac tu ri ng fillllS go multinational? Why do firtn s invest in fo reign 
countries? These questions were central in the evolution of the theory of 
intelllational investments. Several strands of explanations have been given thro ugh 
various works calTied out in the last several decades, but none has emerged that 
could be regarded as the so le acceptable theory of foreign direct investment. 
Earl y explanations of the intemational investment phenomena were made with the 
help of international trade theory. The Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis in the 
international trade theoty postulates that a coun try, under assum ptions of per fect 
factor and goods market, exports resources in which it has comparat ive advantage. 
Developed countries have comparati ve advantages in capi ta l, so accord ing to the 
hypothes is they should export capital to countri es which have dearth in capital 
resources. However, empiri cal evidences show otherwise, that not only developed 
countries send international capital to other developed countri es, but also rece ive 
capital fro m other countri es, even fro m the capita l poor developi ng countri es. 
Moreover, there is little evidence that the crucial assumption of perfect factor and 
goods markets ho lds in the fo reign countri es. 
If capi tal export was the primary function of the fillll, then there wo uld be no need or 
reason fo r investors to get invo lved in the production sector in fore ign countrie, 
when fac tor and goods markets are perfect. As far as the direct investments are 
concerned, there would be little incentive for foreign fillll S to get invo lved in having 
a local subsidiary under risk and uncertai nty if fac tor and goods markets are perfect. 
On the other hand, imperfect market conditions do not deter fore ign direct 
investments. Rather, fillllS find market imperfections advantageous for investing in 
the foreign coun tries as they would provide incentives to cover transaction costs or te' 
overcome d ifficult ies fo r entry into the local markets. In the end, international trade 
theory fa ll s short in explaining the intemational investment phenomenon. 
Several other attempts have been made over the last four decades in developing '-
more comprehensive theoretical framework of FDI (see Dunning, 1999). The mos: 
influential works to that end are by Hymer (1960), Vernon (1966), and Dunnin~ 
(1977). 
Hymer (1960, pub li shed in 1976) depans fro m the international trade and capIta. 
theory by di sti nguish ing port fo lio investment and direct investment. An export 0:· 
capi tal through pOl1folio investment is noth ing but just capital transfer. while direr: 
investment invo lves production and control of assets through subs idi aries. Fore igr. 
direct investment, by definition, is ownership of assets by foreign firnl s fo r the 
purposes of contro lling the use of those assets (Graham and Krugman, 199 1). FD: 
invo lves in the transfer o f a bundle of resources including management ski ll , . 
entrepreneurshi p, capita l, and other resources to the subsidiari es but do not relinquist 
the ownershi p of resources or ri ghts to the subsidiari es abroad. MNE's are 
motivated to prod uce abroad with the expectation of earning economic rent for the 
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bundle of resources transferred. The behavior patterns of the multinational firms 
therefore are different that need full er explanations. 
Hymer provided with the he lp of industri al organi zation theory a more plausible 
microeconomic explanation of FDl. First of a ll , se lection of industri es for FOI is not 
arbitrary or random, rather imperfections in the product and service markets 
inOuence FOI decisions. To enter into the domestic market as outsider the firm has to 
bear ex tra costs for maintai ning overheads, meeting communication and transport 
expenses, paying higher sa lari es to expatri ate personnel, overcome diffi culti es due to 
unfamiliarity with local conditions, poli cies, rul es, and regulations, language, soc ial 
customs, business and government bureaucracy. To meet these ex tra costs and still 
make profit from the economic rent in the competitive markets, the firm must have 
some kind of finn-specific ownership advantages. The firm 's ownership advantages 
could be in the fonn of advanced technology, better techniques, R&D capabilities, 
patents, brand name identification, product differentiation , superior managerial , 
administrative and marketing skill s, access to low-cost fundin g, exchange rate 
different ials, economy of sca le, etc , which give MNEs competitive edge over the 
local finns . Whether multinational firnl S wi ll exploit the firnl- specific ownership 
advantages through the mechanisms of FOI or thro ugh li censing, depend on the 
nature of the advantages and the degree of market imperfecti on. The hi gher the 
degree of market imperfections, the greater wil l be the incentive of the finn to 
engage in FD! rather than in li cens ing. 
Later, many economists ex tended Hymer' s industri al organizati on explanations of 
FOJ. Kindelberger (1969) points out that imperfect market structure in monopoli sti c 
competition detennines the conduct of the MNEs. He identifies several areas of 
market imperfections where fiml-specific advantages can provide competitive edge 
to MNEs over local finns by internalizing its production in the host country. They 
are: product differenti ation , special skill s and knowledge, unequal access to 
resources and factors of production, and economy of sca le. Caves ( 197 1) presented 
similar analysi s, defi ned market structure that dictates conduct o f the fiml . In hi s 
view, however, sectors dominated by oligopolies will draw most FO r. If the firm has 
product di fferentiati on, it wi ll make hori zontal investment in the same sector. 
Without product differentiation firnl s will go for vertical investment in sectors that 
are behind in the production. 
Vernon (1966) provides another view o f exp laining FO I tlu'ough hi s product cyc le 
hypothesi s. He expla ins that firms which have comparati ve advantages in technology 
and innovative capabil ities arising from the factor endowments will invent and 
produce a product in the home country near to its irlllovative activiti es and own 
markets. The product is exported to countri es where demand patterns and supply 
capabil ities are simi lar to the home coun try. As and when competitors challenging in 
the home and foreign markets emerge, the finn may shi fl production abroad where 
labor and production costs are economica ll y feasib le to bear. The producti on 
subsidiary suppl ies the product in the host count ry and even export back to home 
country. The finn may try to rai se barriers to entry into the oli gopolistic competition 
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(Knickerbocker, 1973), or may attempt to intemali ze markets so as to reduce market 
imperfect ions and ex ternal competition (Buckley, 1992). Lnternali zation for skill s. 
techno logy, raw materi als, wo uld lower firm 's transaction costs and would protect 
agai nst ex ploiting market imperfection by the competi tors. 
The idea of transaction cost internali zation came from Buckley and Casson (1976). 
The in termediate product markets are imperfect due to hi gh transaction costs. 
pm1icul arly when managed by many finTIs in an oli gopo li stic competition. The finTI 
may hold such proprietary assets as marketing, di stribu tion, designs, or such 
in tangible assets as patents, trademarks, innovati ve capacity, whose trans fer may be 
costly, or diffi cu lt to sale or lease. When markets are integrated by firms, the 
transacti on costs could be minimized and market imperfections reduced through 
internalization . 
The importance of interna li zing transaction costs resulting from market imperfec tion 
leads to the choice of location for production . The internali zation theory tri es to 
address the dilemma of decidi ng between licensing of producti on to loca l finn s, or 
arrange own production in a particular location. To thi s end. the fiml must make 
decisions about the location and the mode of control of operations. If product ion and 
contro l are located in the home country, the finTI exports; if production and contro l 
are located in the host countlY, FDI is made. Thus to exp lain M~E's behavior in FDI 
there is need to integrate location-specific information with internali zation vm·iab les. 
It is not surpri sing if these pioneering but diverse strands of wo rk trying to exp lain 
FDI phenomenon seem to have failed in presenting a complete theory of FDI. 
Dunning (1977, 1980, 1988) reso lved this prob lem by bringing them together in an 
'eclectic paradigm', popularly Imown as "OLI' framework. According to thi s 
parad igm FDI is determined by three groups of advantages that MNEs may have: 
ownership advantages, location advantages, and intem alization advantages . 
A finTI has ownership advalltage over other ri val fi nTI s if it possesses, or has access 
to, ceI1ai n tangible or intangible assets, such as patents, trademarks, blueprints. 
teclmology and infornlation, managerial, marketi ng, and entrepreneuri a l ski li s. 
organi zational layouts and access to intermediate or final product markets. These 
ownership advantages are firm-spec ific advantages that pro,·ide the firm market 
power and cost advantages to outweigh other di sadvantages it m ay have in do in~ 
business. 
A finn must consider the locatioll advalltage offered by a host coun try if it dec ides te 
produce there instead of producing at home and expol1 to the foreign markets. Thi s 
adva ntage derives fro m the host country 's comparative advantage in resource 
endowment and transact ion cost advantage, including economic, soc io-cultural. 
political. legal, insti tuti onal fac tors, market size and structure. tariffs and corporate 
tax, law and enfo rcement, government polic ies and legislation. The host count ry's 
attractiveness to For provides cmcial location advantage to the firnl . 
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Finally, the illternalizatioll advantage is important to the firm if it finds 
advantageous to produce the product abroad, parti cu larly if it possesses propri etary 
product or production process. It is not an obvious decision as it still can produce the 
product by licensing a local firm instead of setting up a foreign subsidiary. But in 
order to protect its proprietary intangible assets from market fa il ure in the transaction 
(e.g. non-availability of suitab le licensee, patent or trademark vio lation without 
enforcement, etc.), the firm may find it advantageous to have the internal control of 
the subsidiary, rather than to leave contro l up to the li censee. 
If the firnl has only ownership advantages, it would do business with foreign 
countries through exports, li censing or sa le of intangible assets. If it has 
internalization advantagcs, the linn may produce abroad th ro ugh e ither its 
subsidiaries or licensee in the host countries. If, however, the firm has location 
advantages then combined with any of the other advantages FDI becomes profitable 
venture for the firm. Thus, from host countries point of view, they have very li ttl e to 
offer in ternlS of ownership advantages and internali zati on advantages to attract FDJ. 
They can only offer location advantages to attract FDJ. 
The eclectic OLl paradigm gives a general fra mework of the economic rati onale for 
international production by thc MNEs .But, what motiva tcs the finn to invest 
abroad? Based on thi s pa radigm Dunning ( 1993) identifies four reasons for an MNE 
to invest in foreign countries: fo r resources (resource-seeking), for markets (market-
seeking), for efficiency (efficiency-seeking), and for new strategic assets ( strategic 
asset-seeking). 
Resource-seeking investors will place subsidiaries abroad in order to obtain from the 
resource abundant countries stab le and inexpensive suppl y of raw materials, energy, 
and facto rs of production. Cheaper labor and inputs lower cost o f production and 
increase competitiveness of the MNEs. Market-seekillg invcstors go to the host 
country either to protect their market shares from competitors or to open up new 
markets for their goods and services. They consider the market size, income, and 
market growth for local consumption. Most often their investment decisions are 
based on tariff-jumping and getti ng around transaction or transportation costs. 
Efficiellcy-seekillg investors make rational decisions on resource based structures to 
gain from the common governance of geographicall y dispersed ac tivities. Thei r aim 
is to produce in a few countries, each having own advantages of factor endowments, 
location, institutional systems, economic polici es, government incentives, and 
market structures with a vicw to scrvice large numbcr of markcts. Also, they seek 
countries with macroeconomic and politica l stabil ity, well developed open and cross-
border markets. Lastly, stmlegic assel-seekillg investors engage in maintaining and 
enhancing the firm's internationa l status , with less concern abou t other advantages of 
host countries . (Dunning, I 993). 
Another line of thoughts ex plain ing why a firm would become multinational and 
how location factors will affect FDl for forei gn production was forwarded by 
combining explanations from the trade theory and the industrial organi zation theory 
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under so called ' New trade theory' (Markusen, 1995: and Mark usen and Venables 
,1998). Fol lowing conventional line of trade theories, two di stinct types of FDl are 
identi fi ed: market-oriented FDI and export-oriented FDI. One is to better serve the 
local market; the other is to get lower-cost inputs. (Shatz and Venables, 2000). 
Market-oriented FDI are those that typically set up enterpri ses in the host country to 
suppl y goods and services to the needs of the loca l market. This is also ca ll ed 
' hori zontal ' FDI as addit ional plants dup licating same production processes are 
established in different locat ions in the host country. The main reason for thi s type of 
FDI is the market access into the host country by protecting the ex isting loca l market 
or promoting and expanding new market by providing product and services from 
within the country, instead of exporting from the home country. Another reason for 
market-oriented FDl is to reduce costs of transport or tariffs associated with exports 
and to reduce deli velY time of supplying products and services from the home 
country plants. However, there can be additional costs involved in sett ing up plants 
within the host country in terms of fixed and variab le costs depending on the factor 
prices, techno logy, and economy of scale. Other conditions in the forei gn country, 
e.g. govemment rules, regulations, and tax systems may translate into additional 
costs, which can be mitigated through sub-contracting, joint ventures, or li censing. 
As long as the va lue of FDI exceeds net of additional fixed costs and savings from 
variab le costs (transport costs and tariffs), the FD I has a strategic va lue, and as long 
as it is at the margin, there will be location advantage for the host country. MNE's 
profit margin, however, will depend on the extent of sales which can be higher in 
larger market size. Thus, market size, prospects for market growth, leve l of 
economic development wi ll provide locational attractiveness to market-oriented FDI. 
Export-oriented FDI seeks to use low-cost inputs in the resource endowed host 
countries to produce goods for exporting to home country or any other country. The 
outputs produced in the host country can be fini shed goods, or intennediate inputs 
required for other plants. They are generally exported to the home country market 
and so do not depend on the market size of the host country. Expol1-oriented FDI is 
also called 'verti cal' FDl as it slices the production chain of the fim1 vertically and 
sets up part of the chain in the low-cost country. The low-cost input might be cheap 
labor, raw materials, energy resources, primary commodities, intennediate goods in 
which the host country has comparative advantages. Country's comparati,·e 
advantages on factor endowments may however change over time and international 
mobi lity of certain factors of production , e.g. capital and technology, may not 
provide any comparati\"e advantages. It is the location of the immobi le fac tors of 
production, e.g. human labor and natural resources give comparative advantages that 
attract export-oriented FDI. The abundance of di fferential endowment of immobile 
factors strongly influences the location dec isions, the relative abundance of a 
particular immobile fac tor will attract FDI for production of those products that use it 
intensively (Chunalai , 1997) 
The different strands o f thoughts attempting to explain the FDI phenomena from 
either intemational trade or industrial organization theories have offered di fferent 
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explanations of why firm go mult inational, why it dec ides to produce in host 
countries wi th FDI, instead o f licensing, and what motivates it to select a location for 
FOr. Each of these influenti al tho ughts, however, fall s short and no convergence to 
any generalized theo ry of the FDI phenomenon has emerged. international trade 
theory does not give any convi ncing answers to the q uesti ons. Hymer gives 
persuasive argument showing the pi tfa ll s of trade theory in expl aining the FDl 
phenomenon and uses industrial organizati on to provide much better analys is. 
However, his approach does not lead to any predictability of MNE's behavi or in 
FOr. Dunning's ec lecti c O LI parad igm is built fro m the compromi se of all 
frameworks and provides acceptable reasoning of why a finll wo uld become 
multinationa l and why it wou ld invest abroad. Hi s fram ework based on industri al 
organizat ion though expla ins MNE's behav ior, it does not adequately address 
predictabili ty of FDl. Markusen's framework using New trade theory explains why 
firms invest abroad and identifies types o f FDl in the host countri es, based on market 
size and resource endowments. but lacks comprehensiveness. Despite these 
shortcomings, Dunning's OLI paradigm has remained as the most influenti al 
thoughts on FOr. The OLi paradigm has been the basis upon which different facto rs 
of FDI are empiricall y tested . 
IV. LOCATI ON DETERMINANTS OF FD I: 
The lack of consensus in the explaining capac ity of any parti cular theoreti cal 
framework of the For phenomenon has led researchers to re ly mainly on empirical 
evidence. The empirical li terature on FOr is extensive with stati sti cal investi gations 
and regression ana lyses of the detemlinants. Empirical studies mainly tri ed to 
identify sign ificant detenlli nants of FDI with econometric techniques, rather than 
evolving any theoreti cal framework. These approaches are so di stant from the 
mainstream theories that empirical evidences of detenllinants are sometimes temled 
as 'measurement w ithout theory' (Schneider and Frey, 1985; Chakrabarty, 200 1). 
Moreover, controversies and disagreements relating to methodologies and confli cti ng 
findings abound empirica l stud ies. Desp ite these differences, the empirica l studies 
provide wealth of infonllation regarding robustness o f the FOr determinants. 
The purpose of this section is twofold: fi rst, to identify from the literature survey the 
demand-side factors or detelminants that attract MNEs for locating their FDI in the 
host coun tries, and second , to ind icate importance and robustness of the detenllinants 
for the host countries to improve attracti veness o f the FDllocation. 
The empirical detemlinants or factors of FOr can be class i fi ed into two groups: 
supply-side detellll inants and demand-side determinants (Chunalai , 1997) . The 
supply-side detellllinants are those that are inherent within the firm , its investment 
potential and investment patt ern, intangi ble assets, innovat ive capacity, product life 
cyc le, reaction to o ligopo listic competition, and internali zati on capabiliti es. 
According to Dunning's OLi paradigm suppl y-s ide detemlinants entail ownership 
advantages and interna li zation 
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advantages. However, the firm 's ownership advantages arise from its own 
technological and innovati ve capabilities and re lative to the economic development 
level of the home country. In general, firm s in developed countri es have higher 
ownership advantages due to higher technological and innovati ve capacities and 
higher levels of economic development. Fimls in developed countries also have 
more ownership advantages from its superi or technology, product differentiation. 
efficient management and entrepreneuri al skill s, and knowledge-based intangibl e 
assets, in particular. Due to the nature 0 f ownership advantages and degree of market 
imperfections, there are incentives as well as stake for the firm to intern ali ze the use 
o f ownership advantages through FDl and operation contro l. 
The demand-side determinants are those host country's attracti veness that the fi m 
considers location advantages for FDL If the fiml is contented with its suppl y-s ide 
detenninants, and is motivated by its ownership advantages and intemali zation 
advantages to prefer FD! to exports, then it targets search for appropriate host 
country for its FDI location w here suppl y-side determinants coincides with the 
demand-side detemlinants. There is a large body of li terature that shows benefi cial 
impacts of FD! on the host country' s economy. Developing countries par1 icu larJy. 
being convinced abo ut the beneficial impacts of FD!, indicate their demand for FDI 
by improving th ei r attractive attributes. The investing finn makes its FOr location 
decision after considering host of issues, primary among these are ex temal location 
determinants. For the host countries it wou ld be helpful to know which detemlinants 
are at tractive to MNE's decision for FDI location so that they could then manipulate 
these determinants. 
The demand-side determinants can be grouped into three main categories: economic. 
social, and political (Root and Ahmed, 1979; Agarwal, 1980). The majority of the 
studies on the demand structure ofFD! concentrate primarily on economic variab les 
(Durming, 1973; Lunn , 1980; C ulem, 1988). Socia l and political determinants are 
either discarded or are given limited consideration (Root and Ahmed, 1979: 
Dunning, 198 I ; Schneider and Frey, 1985 ; Nigh, 1985). in thi s review, however, we 
have grouped the locational determinants using t iNCT AD c lassification : economic. 
govemment policy, and business facilitation (Table 2) . 3 
Economic Determinants 
The preva lent view in the literature is that MNEs are mainl ,- attracted by stro n~ 
economic fundamenta ls in the host countries (see e.g. Dunning, 1993 ; Globermal 
and Shapiro , 1999). The most important economic detemlinants that affect M:'JEs 
location decision for FDI are market size, labor availability and wages, trade 
J Among the empirical stud ies, some emphasized developed countries, others considered developing 
countries (see Billington, t 999 for mentions of specific studies) . Since large differences in the facto r~ 
are like ly to ex ist berween developed and developing countries, it might be use ful for our study to 
review those that deal with the developing countries. However, such snldies are very few that might 
not reOect the location fa ctors well. Several studies have examined factors in both dew loped and 
developing countries together, but their results carulot be separated . So we decided to review studies 
without regard to host country emphasis. 
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libera li zation, infrastructure, etc . Econometric studies have tried to find signi ficances 
of these determinants (Tab le 3). 
Market size: 
Market size has been the single most highly used determinant in the FDI literature. 
The literature on market s ize detellllinant of FDI is not on ly large but al so widely 
accepted due to its signi ficance. Market size and market growth together are 
considered important location dec iding factors in the developing countries, 
particularl y for market-seeking FDI. 
Table 2: Location Detellll inan ts of FDI 
Economic Determi nants 
Market-seeking 
• Market size 
• Market growth 
• Market structure 
• Market access 
Reso urce-seeking 
• Low-cost unsk illed labor 
• Ski lied labor 
• Land costs, buildings rents, 
fees 
• Raw material s, components, 
parts 
E fficien cy-seekin g 
• Resource and input costs 
adjusted to productivi ty 
• Transportation and 
communication costs 
• Membership In regional 
integration agreements 
Asset-seeking 
• Embodyi ng fillll created 
innovative assets 
• Physical infrast ructure (roads, 
ports, power, 
te lecomm un icat ion 
Governmen t Policy Determinants 
• Economic, social, and political 
stability 
• Privati zation policy 
• Trade policy 
• Tax po li cy 
• Capital control policy 
• Exchange rate policy 
• Interest rate 
• Industrial policy 




Business Faci litation 
• In vestment incentives 
• lnvestment promotion schemes 
• Reduced corruption 
• Bureaucratic efficiency 




Propel1y rights protection 
Support services 




• Pre-and post- investment services 
• Ex port promotion zones 
• Social ameniti es 
Source: Adapted from UNCTAD (2001) Table [V . I 
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The MNEs are attracted to larger market to explo it the economy of scale and profits 
by servicing the host country's existing and potenti al demand w ith its market-
seeking FO I. The demand is often measured by per capita gross domestic product 
(G OP), which serves as a proxy variable to market size" Empirical studies by Root 
and Ahmed (1979), Kravis and Lipsey (1982), Nigh (1985), find per capita GOP 
signifi cant determinant of FDl inflow. Schneider and Frey (1985) find rea l per capita 
GNP is the most signifi cant detel1n inant of per capita For in develop ing countri es. 
Culem (1988) finds in UK industri es, and Ourming (1980) in US FO r, strong marker 
correlati ons. Wheeler and Mody (1992) , Sader (1993), find strong correlati on 
between market s ize and FOI in developing economi es, wh ile Tsai (1994). 
Shamsuddin (1998) and Billington (1999) find that market size have pos itive impact 
on FOI in fl ows. Lucas (1993), however, finds weak but positive assoc iation between 
market size and For inflows. Edward (1990) find s a negative relati onship between 
rea l per capita income and FOI inflows. He argues that host countri es with lower per 
capita income will tend to receive higher share of FDl. However, he also finds larger 
domesti c market size attracts MNEs for FOI location . On the other hand , Loree and 
Guisinger ( 1995), and Wei (2000) find impact of market size insignifi cant on FO I 
inflows. Chakrbarti (200 I) in hi s cross-country study finds strong support for the 
expl anatory power of the market size in host country FOI inflows. 
GOP growth is another vari able used which serves as proxy to potential market 
growth. Market growth indicates the prospect for expansion of market size and 
demand increase over time. Schneider and Frey (1985) and Culem (1988) show 
market growth has a positive effect on FDl. GDP growth is parti cularly more 
signifi cant detel111inant for small countries showing market potential than GOP as the 
current size of the incremental national income indicated by GOP wo uld be very 
small. 
Labor Costs and Productivity 
Table 3: Effects of potenti al determinants on FDI 
FDI Positive effect Negative effect Insignificant effect 
Determinants 
Market s ize Root & Ahmed Edwards (1990) Loree & Guisinger 
( 1979) Jasperson, ( 1995) 
Ounning ( 1980) Aylward, & Knox Wei (2000) 
Kravis and Lipsey (2000) Hausmann & 
( 1982) Fernandez-Arias 
N igh (1985) (2000) 
Scluleider & Frey 
( 1985) 
Culem (1988) 
4 Other proxies used in some studies but not fa vored were, per capita GN P, GNP, and absolute GO P 
to measure marker size. See Chakrabarti (200 1). 
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Wheeler & Mody 
( 1992) 
Sader (1993) 
Shamsuddin ( 1994) 
Tsai (1994) 
Bi llington (1999) 
J ackso ll & 
Markowski ( 1995) 
Chakraba!1i (2001) 
Growth rate Root & Ahmed Nigh ( 1988) 
( 1979) Tsai( 1994) 
Lun n (1980) 
• 
Schneider & Frey 
( 1985) 
Culem ( 1988) • 
Wheeler & Mody 
(1992) 
Bi llington (1999) 
Infrastructure Root & Ahmed 
(1979) 
Wheeler & Mody 
( 1992) 
Loree & Gu isi nger 
( 1995) 




Human capital Noorbakhsh & Root & Ahmed Lucas (1 993) 
Paloni (2001) ( 1979) Tsai(1994) 
Jackson & Schneider & Frey 
Markowski (1995) ( 1985) 
Narula ( 996) 
Labor cost Swedenborg ( 1979) Saunders (1982) Lucas ( 1990) 
Nankani (1979) Flamm (1 984) Rolfe & Whi te 
Wheeler & Mody Schneider & Frey ( 199 1 ) 
( 1992) ( 1985) Sader ( 1993) 
Culem ( 1988) Tsai (1994) • 
Shamsuddin ( 1994) Loree & Gu isinger 
Chunalai ( 1997) ( \995) 
Lipsey (1999) 
Trade barrier Lunn ( 1980) Cu lem (1 988) Blonigen & 
Feenstra ( 1996) 
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Openness Kravis 
( 1982) 










Chakrabarti (200 I) 
Exchange rate Edwards (1990) 
and exchange Barre l and Pain 
rate vo latility 1( 1996) 
Tax 
Politi ca l 
instab ility 
! Swenson (1994) 
I Green (1972) 
I 
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Contractor (1990) 








Crawley (200 I) 
Hal1man ( 1984) 
Gubert & Multi 
(l991 ) 
Woodward & Rolfe 
( 1993) 
Hines & Rice 
{I 994) 
Loree & Guisinger 
(l995) 
Cassou (1995) 
Ban-el & Pain 
( 1998) 
Bi llington (1999) 
Wei (2000} 





Sader (l99 1) 
Goldberg (1993) 
Blonigen ( 1997) 
Campa & Goldberg 
( 1995) 
Tuman & Emmen 
( 1999) 
Root & .-\hmed 
(1979) 






Wheeler & Mod\' 
(1992) 
Loree & Guisinger 
( 1995) 
Jasper» n, 
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Investment Gubert & Mutti Contracto r ( 199 1) 
Incen tives (1991 ) Caves ( 1996) 
Loree & Guisi nger 
( 1995) 
BIT & RI Rose-Ackennan et. a!. Ha llward-Driemei r 
(2004) (2003) 
Neumayer & Spess 
(2004) 
COlTU ption Wei (2000) 
Source: Adapted from Chakrabarti (200 I) and expanded by the au thor. 
MNEs with interest in export-seeking FDI are generall y attracted by locations that 
have lower wages as they wo uld lower production costs. Theoreti call y the wage 
hypothes is sounds good, but empiri ca l studies have shown mixed results on the 
effects of low wages on FDI (Chakrabarty, 200 1). Earli er studi es inc luding Flamm 
(198-1), Schn ieder and Frey ( 1985), Culem ( 1988), Shamsudd in ( 1994), and 
Mudambi (1995) find higher wages di scourages FD !. Wheeler and Mody (1992) find 
labor cost a dominant factor for FDI in electronics industry and a weak pos it ive 
factor in manufacturing industry. Tsai ( 1994) finds strong support for wage 
hypothesis wi th data over the 1980s, but weak suppol1 in data over the 1970s. 
Edwards ( 1980) finds insignificant effects of wage on FDI in data over the 1970s. 
Caves (1974), Swedenburg (1979), and Nankani (1979) find a pos itive linkage 
between real wage and FDI inflow. 
Chunalai (1997) argued that most studi es of labor cost variables, as surveyed by 
Dunning ( 1993), show either wrong signs (pos iti vel, or stati sticall y not signi fi cant 
because they use abso lute wage rates rather than effi ciency wage rates (abso lute 
wages nonnalized by productivity) . Higher absol ute wages are associated with 
higher productivity and so the positive sign. Using effi c iency wages he found labor 
cost stati sticall y significant location fac tor affecting FDI inflows into developing 
countries. 
Besides wages, MNEs may also consider avail ab ili ty and productivity of labor in the 
host country. Availab ility of more labor, indicated by high unemployment rate, is 
attract ive to investors as wages will be low. Bi llington (1999) with U.K. data found 
positive relationsh ip between unemployment rate and FDI inflows. 
Although human capital and skill improve producti vity, studies have not found much 
evidence of their impacts to FDl inflows. Root and Ahmed (1979),Schnieder and 
Frey ( 1985), and Narula ( 1996) find negative relationship of human capital proxies 
with FDl inflows, but Jackson and Markowski (1995) find positive relationship . 
HO\\·ever, Noorbakhsh, Paloni , and Yousse f (200 I) using secondary school 
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enrollment and cumulative years in secondary schools in the 1990s as proxies, find 
human capital signifi cant detenninant o f FDI innows hav ing location-spec ific 
advantage for developing countri es. 
In frastructure 
In fras tructure inc ludes vari ous means of communication, transportation, tele- links. 
energy networks, etc. Availab ility of roads, railways, airports, seaports, telephones. 
info rmati on, e lec tric ity, is important fo r increased product ivity and effi cient physica: 
movement of products and inputs. There is unanimity in the empirical studies tha: 
good and effi cient in frastructure is important part icularly to export-ori ented FD I. 
Root and Ahmed ( 1979), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Lo ree and Guisinger ( 1995 1 
found infrastructure development sign ificant to selecti on of FDI location ir. 
deve loping countri es. The findings have been supported by Jac kson and Markowsk: 
( 1995) fo r Asia-Pac ific countri es and Asiedu (2002) for Africa. 
Root and Ahmed ( 1979), Wheeler and Mody ( 1992), Loree and Guisinger ( 1995 , 
fou nd in frastructure development signifi cant to selection of FDI location il: 
developing countri es. The fi ndings have been supported by Jackson and Markowsk: 
( 1995) fo r As ia-Pacific countries and As iedu (2002) for Africa. 
Kumar (200 1) made a cross-country study of infrastructu re availability and FD: 
innows. In his view export-ori ented FDI is effi ciency-seeking in nature and ha.; 
different kind of obj ecti ves-its focus is ei ther on production for home-country or or. 
serving thi rd country markets. As such MNE's selection of FDI location is more 
sensiti ve to ava ilability of quality in frastructure than overall FDI. His study of FDI 
of two home countries-U.S. and Japan, and of 66 host countri es, found compos ite 
infrastructure index has positive significant relationship with third country ex port-
orientation of both home country MNEs and pos itive signi ficant relationship w itr. 
home country ori entation of U.S. MNEs. 
Govel-nment Policy 
Important role o f the government poli cies in influencing FDI location dec isions ha, 
been well recognized but whether it is 'bigger' than an y other factor is long debated I 
Loree and Guis inger, 1995). The main problem is that statistical analysis alone can no: 
detemline its importance. One problem might be that most govemment po licies art 
quali tative in nature which is difficult to measure. Sometimes proxies are used . 
which make interpretations o f the result ind irect. However, recent studies art 
focusing on the measurement problem more carefully. 
Brewer ( 1993) li sts a number o f host govemment poli cies (Table 4) that may directl \ 
(e.g monetary po lic ies conceming money suppl y, exchange rates, and interest rates. 
capital controls, restri ctions on pro fi t remittances) or indirectl y (e.g. antitrusL 
intellectual property ri ghts) innuence FDI innow via their effects on marke: 
imperfections. His argument is that there are numerous and diverse types 0: 
govemment polic ies, as shown in the Table 4, including many di fferent dimension, 
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of variabi lity (e.g. relat ive cross-national differences in one countlY's policies 
compared with that of other countries), which can increase or decrease market 
imperfections. Whether FDJ flows will increase or 
decrease depends on the degree of market imperfections in the host country -the 
greater is the market imperfections, the higher will be the FDJ inflows and vice 
versa. Corporate strategies will, accord ing to the FDI theory, internali ze the 
government policies and market imperfecti ons. Thus the causal path is from the 
MNE's strategies, to govel11ment po licies, to market imperfec tions, to FD I flows 
(Brewer, 1993) . 
The govel11ment has control and man ipulating power over econom ic fac tors, and so 
government policies affect FDJ through the econom ic detel111inants. Trade 
liberalization eases entry of the fore ign investors. Besides easing entlY of fo reign 
investors with libera lization, govel11ment poli cies may be framed to attract FDI 
inflows through investment incentives and bilateral or regional investment schemes. 
Table 4: Government Policies that Affect FDT 
Host Govern ment policies that may 









Protectionist import policies 
Weak enforcement of intellectua l 
property rights 
Weak ant itrust (competition 
policy) 
Subsidies on inbound FDJ 
Overvalued currency 
Discriminatory govel11ment 
po licies of procurement against 
foreign firms 
Discriminatory technical 
standards setting processes 
Price contro ls 
• Restrictions on profit remittances 
from subsidiaries to parents 
• Expoli controls on outputs and 
import restrictions on inputs 
Hos t Government policies th a t may 








Liberalization of restrictions on 
trade and FDI inflow 
Privatization of govel11ment-
owned enterpri ses 
Currency converti bi li ty 
Rebates on tariffs on imports of 
inputs fo r export-oriented FDI 
projects 
Implementati on of anti-dumping 
measures against imports 
imposition of countervailing 
duties on imports of goods 
subsidized by export countri es 
Enforcement of anti -trust and 
intell ectual property rights 
Source: Brewer, Thomas L. 1993, 'Government Policies, Market Imperfections, and 
Foreign Direct Investment', JOIll"lwl of International Bllsiness SlIIdies, 24( I): 101-
120. 
Trade liberali zation 
While access to domest ic market-given by its size and growth is important to the 
market-seeking investor, it is less important to export-seeking investor confronting 
trade restrictions. Host country's trade liberalization attracts FDI inflow as it allows 
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free movement of goods by lifting restrictions on getting production plants, 
machineri es, and inputs into the host country and exporting products to home or any 
third country. 
The effects of trade liberali zation are identifi ed in two ways: trade barriers (tari ffs 
and quotas) and openness to trade (measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to 
GOP). On trade barriers, Culem (1988) finds signifi cantly negati ve relationship with 
FO I inflows, whi le Bloni gen and Feenstra ( 1996) find that trade barriers have 
insignifi cant ro le in attracting FOI. Lucas (1980) fin ds pos it ive effect of trade 
barriers on FD l but hi s data is considered to be weak to support thi s fi nding. 
Openness to trade has been of particular concern to expol1-oriented investors In 
decid ing FOl location. There has been overwhelming support in the empirical studies 
for pos itive effects of openness on FDl inflows. Culem (1988), Edwards ( 1990), and 
Chunalai (1997) fo und sign ificantly positive relationship between openness and FD I 
inflow. Clearly openness encourages FDI. Chakrabarti (200 1) finds evidence that in 
FOI location dec ision openness has been the most reliab le indicator of the 
attrac ti veness after market size. With the advent of WTO regime, however, tariffs 
and quotas have reduced and openness increased, which have lessened concerns on 
market access by the investors. 
In order to attract FDI host countries often provide several types of tax incentives to 
the MNEs, e.g.: reduced rates or tax ho lidays on corporate profit taxes and income 
taxes. In recent years these types of fisca l incentives and tax holidays have 
pro li ferated particularly in the developing countries (Bora, 2002). However, the 
literature is inconclusive about their influence on FDI location decisions. Grubert 
and Mutti (1 99 1), Woodward and Rolfe (1993), Loree and Guisinger (1995), Cassou 
(1997), Barrel and Pain (1998), and Billington (i 999) found corporate taxes to have 
sign ificant negative effect on FDl inflows. But Root an Ahmed (1 978), Wheeler and 
Mody (1992) , Jackson and Markowski (1995), Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova 
(1998) observed insignificant effect of corporate taxes on FDI fl ows. Swenson 
(1994) found positive correlation between taxes and FDI inflows. 
The general conclusion that emerged from the econometri c studies is that effects of 
tax incentives on FDI in flow are rather limited5 It is because tax incentives 
disc riminate between domestic and forei gn firm s, between those who show losses in 
earl y years and those that do not, between relatively capital -intensive activiti es and 
labor-intensive activities. Also, tax incenti ves are generall y given to selected few 
priority areas, but as competition grows pressure wou ld develop to expand coverage 
in other areas, making the tax system complex and tax revenue co ll ection problem-
ridden (Lim, 2001). All these complexities aris ing from the incentives might lead to 
an ineffic ient and distorted tax system. Furthern10re, taxation is a government 
5 For more detailed discussions on tax incentive effects on FDI. see Morrisset and Pimja, (2000). 
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apparatus which can be changed very easily, putting investments into diffi cult 
position if they are set up on the basis of tax incenti ves alone. 
However, empirical evidence show FOI inflows have continued to show growth in 
the countri es offering tax incen ti ves. Morisset (2003) explained thi s phenomenon 
that tax incentives have more effects on the composition of FOr than on its level and 
that tax incenti ves are effecti ve to attract FOI in parti cular sector o f industri es. 
Exchange rates 
The exchange rate is long cons idered to be a crucial detellllinant of FOI. There are 
several interpretations of exchange ra te's role in location dec isions. One of the 
interpretations is that undervalued currency of the host country makes the investment 
less expensive than if the cu rrency was overvalued. On the other hand , weak 
currency of the country may affect firm 's exports to the country which Illay try to 
offset by setting up pl ants in the host country. However, in the same token the pro fit 
repatriation frolll the undervalued currency area could al so be low due to the weak 
exchange rate and may face high exchange rate risk. To avoid high exchange rate 
risk with weak cun·ency, the firm may prefer to invest in a country where the 
cun·ency is stronger. 
The empirical studies on the ro le of exchange rate and exchange rate vo latility 
provide mixed findings. Caves (1988), Froot and Stein ( 1991), Blonigen (1995), and 
Blonigen and Feenstra ( 1996) report strong negative relationship between a 
country' s exchange rate and FOI. Edwards (1990) and Barrell and Pain (1996) find 
sign ificantly positive relationship , while Sader (1991), Blonigen (1997), and Tuman 
and Emmert (1999) observed insign ificant relationship between exchange rate and 
FOI. Goldberg and Crawley (2003) finds negative effect of exchange rate vo latility 
on FOJ in some countries, while Goldberg (1993) and Campa and Goldberg (1995) 
show the relationship ins igni fi can!. 
Bilateral and Regional Investment Treaties 
In recent years, there has been a pro li ferat ion of bilateral investment treaties (BIT) 
between partner countries, which seek to promote and protect FOI with provisos for 
gradual decrease or eliminati on of measures and restrict ions on entry and operations 
of the MNEs and for application of pos itive standards of treatment towards 
elimination of discrimination agai nst foreign firm s (Banga, 2003). Similar prov isos 
have been included in the regional investment treaties (RlT) (or in the regional 
investment agreements). The main purpose of the govelllment polices to sign BIT 
and RlT is to provide legal and institutional support to the MNEs for their FDI 
location in the host country. Whether signing bilateral investment treati es and 
regional investment agreements have any differential impact on FDI inflows has 
been the focus in a li mited number of empirical studies. 
ESS Working Paper 06 20 
Demand-s ide Location Determinants for AI/raeting FDf 
Hallward-Dri emeier (2003) looking at the bil ateral FDt flows from 20 OEeD 
countri es to 3 1 developing countri es over the 1980 to 2000 peri od observed that BIT 
between partner countri es does not increase FDI fl ows from developed countri es to 
deve loping countri es. But Rose-Ackerman el. a!. (2004) analyzing data for the same 
peri od fin d that developing countri es rece ive hi gher share o f global FDt flows from 
developed country partners6 Neumayer and Spess (2004) find develop ing countries 
gain more FDt by signing BIT with developed countries but it may not be substanti al 
to offset the incurred costs in the nego ti ati on process. The stud y al so finds that the 
functi ons of BITs provide institutional quali ty o f the hos t country (e.g. political ri sk. 
government stabil ity et.) so that carrying out the obligati ons of BIT improves 
institutional quality which attracts more FDI. 
Poli tical stabi li ty 
Does host country's political envi rorunent or events affec t FDI inflow? Earl y stud ie, 
on the determinants of FDT have given some di ffe ring views on the impact 01 
political environment on FDt inflow? For example, Green (1972) find s not onl y 
that po li tica l instab ility has vari able influence on the allocati on o f U. S. investments. 
but concludes that there is a positive relationshi p between the investment flow and 
politica l instability in the recipient countri es . Thunell (1977), on the other hand, find, 
that political instability is not directly related to short-ternl fluctuations in the 
investment fl ows, and that the relationship is asymmetric so that the inyesting fi rnl, 
do not react in the same way when a country becomes more stable as when il 
becomes unstable. 
Schneider and Frey (1 985) tested the effec ts of politi cal instability on FDt inflow, 
exc lusively w ith political variables and jointly with economic variables. They find 
FDI in developing countries is determined simultaneously by economic and political 
factors. [n other words, political situation per se do not have much effec t on FDT but 
when combined with economic conditi ons o f the host country, together they 
influence investors' dec ision a lot. 
Wheeler and Mody (1992) included in their study a composite index of soc io-
political unstable conditions as a ri sk factor. Their study found weak impact of soc io-
political ri sk factor in FDI inflows. They concluded that ri sk factor has no parti cular 
imporlance and di scounted its impact on FDI inflows. 
Nonetheless, there is strong belief among researchers that po liti cal in stability in the 
host country affec ts MNE's FDt locati on dec ision. Nigh (1985) finds investors are 
concemed that intra-nation (within country) confli cts pro mote instability in the hos: 
country which would possibly affect their profit or other goa ls. Developed count" 
investors are more concerned with both intra-nation and inter-nation conflicts in the 
6 These contradictory findings might have caused by the methodological differe nces. See Neumayer 
and Spess (2004 ) for explanations. 
1 See Sclmeider and Frey (1985 ) for discussions on the early studies. They have argued that the 
differing views had come about mostly fro m the methodo logical fl aws. 
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developing countries than in the developed countries. They are also concemed that 




Govemment policies may offer some direct and indirect investment incentives to 
attract FOI locat ion. Two categories of FDI incentives most common in developing 
countri es are fiscal incentives and financial incenti ves. Fiscal incentives include tax 
concessions, tax holidays, exempt ion from import duties, and duty drawbacks on 
exp0l1s. Financial incentives include subsidized loans and loan guarantees, publicly 
funded venture capital for ri sky investment, and govemment insurance at preferential 
rates ( Banga, 2003). Other incentives most prevalent in the developing countri es are 
export processing zones and industrial estates. 
The empirical evidence on the impact of incentives, however, is mixed . Some of the 
studies find positive effects (Gruber and Multi , 1991; Loree and Gui singer, 1995; 
Taylor, 2000), whi le other studies (see e.g. Contractor, I 991) find weak influence on 
attracting FOI inflows. Caves ( 1996) finds incentives generally ineffective once the 
economic detem1inants are taken into consideration. Hoeckman and Saggi (2000) 
supports thi s view that while incentives are effective in attracting certain typed of 
FOr, they do not work at the economy wide level. For these reasons, and also not to 
tri gger competing countri es to act in similar manner, Loree and Guisinger (1995) , 
Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) advise not to raise investment incenti ve levels 
exclus ive ly for the sake of increasing FDI inflow. They argue that investment 
incentives are not an efficient to raise national welfare. 
Discussions 
Chakrabarti 's (200 I) cross-country investigation of the partial correlation between 
FOr inflows and fundamental economic determinants finds only few of them robust 
across many of the econometric studies reported in the literature. Despite theoretical 
strength prevailing in each of these studies, not all of the partial correlations when 
considered across studies show equal degree of robustness. His sensitivity study 
yields market size and opelU1ess to trade as the most robust determinants, followed 
by wage, net exports, growth rate, tax, tariff, and exchange rate (in order of 
likelihood). However, all these detenninants affect location decisions for l11arket-
seeking and ex pol1-seeking FOr but with unequal degree of importance. 
Most of the studies on location detem1inants have been conducted before the 1990s 
when FOI was in the early stages . Only a few of these studies investigated with 
recent data. 
In recent years, not only FDI has proliferated, but also many changes have taken 
place in the motives and strategies of the MNEs as well as in the host country 
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responses to the detemlinants for attracting FDI location. Many new detenl1inants 
have shown importance in attracting FDI inflows. Much more emphasis is now given 
by the host countri es in the govemment policy and regulatory changes. Trade 
liberalization and bilateral and regional investment agreements have been found 
most effective detemlinants to attract FDI. Fiscal incentives offered by the host 
countries seem less s ignifi cant than market access and market growth to the 
deve loped country investors, but attract developing country investors. 
Globa li zation induced changes in the FDI detel111inants have not been studi ed full y 
yet. Dunning (2002) makes an attempt to compare changes in the motives and 
strategies of the MNEs between pre- and post-g lobali zation periods. He argued that 
developed country MNE' s motives and strategies of FDl locati on in the developing 
countri es were mainly market resource seeking, join t ventures/greenfie ld 
investments in the 1970/80 period . In 199012000, globali zation has induced changes 
in the strategies to more (vertical) efficiency seeking and subcontracting FDI. On 
the other hand, host country responses in the 1970/80 were predominantly on 
changing FDI policies, especially regulation of incentives and economic 
detemlinants. In the 1990/2000 host countries shifted emphas is to using FDl to 
upgrade competitive advantage, economic polic ies and business facilitation. These 
recent shifts in the MNE 's strategies and host country responses are going to affect 
locat ion determinants. Dunning 's insights stress the need for revamping existing 
empirical determinants in the light of changing strategies of the MNEs. More recent 
studies are needed to capture the changed positions. 
In thi s respect, Nunnenkamp (2002) made notewol1hy contribution in which he 
agreed with Dunning's argument but wanted more evidence. His stud y based on 28 
developing country survey results of the European Round Table of Industriali sts 
(2000) finds that the traditional market-related detemlinants (e.g. market size, market 
growth, entry restrictions, administrative bottleneck, risk factors) are still dominant 
in the selection of FDl location . Non-traditional determinants (e.g. cost factors, 
complementary fac tors of production, skill s, OpetU1eSS to trade) have not become 
more important even with the progress of globa li zation. 
V. ATTRACTIVENESS OF LOCATION DETERMINANTS TO 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 
The previous section surveyed the empiri cal stud ies in the literature on location 
detenninants of FD I, their significance and robustness determined by data analys is 
with application of econometric techniques. While identification of the signifi cant 
detenninants from econometric studies provides useful information on attractiveness 
of FD I location for both demand-sides (the host countries) and suppl y-s ides (MNEs), 
it is however the MNE's critical view of the determinants that is more impOl1ant in 
the deci sion making for selecting FDl location . 
It is rather diffi cult to know what goes through the actual decision process of MNEs 
in the selection of any particular location for their FDI. However, several investor 
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surveys have been cond ucted in recent years that give views of the MNEs on what 
demand-side deteml inan ts they consider important in the selection o f a FDI location. 
On the other hand, these survey results provide demand-s ide host countri es not only 
useful infomlation fo r mak ing their locati on deteml inants attract ive, but al so to bu ild 
bridges between them and the MNEs on the basis of understand ing what influences 
in their location decisions. In this secti on we review a few of the MNE opinion 
surveys . 
The World Bank group conducted a survey of 191 MNEs from North America, 
Europe, and Asia in 200 I with the object ives of understand ing their location 
strategy issues over the nex t three years (MIGA, 2002). Over 70 percent of the 
MNEs surveyed indicated their over all strategy to expand overseas, primaril y in 
manufacturing/process ing areas. They overwhelmi ngly expressed incl inati on to 
expand through bu ild or lease a fac ili ty, or merger and acqui sition, rather than 
expand on an ex isting facility. They li sted the most important obj ectives when 
investing overseas as: improved market access, reduced operating costs, improved 
labor fo rce access, improved productivity, redllced ri sk, and other [actors, all ranked 
in that order. When asked to rank the ' most critical location factors' in locating 
operations overseas, 77 percent 0 f the companies responded access to customers. The 
next cited factors are stable soc ial and politi cal environment (64 percent), ease of 
doing business (54 percent), reliab ility and quality of infrastructure and utilities (50 
percent) . One-thi rd of the respondents cited availability of professional and 
manageri a l staff, corruption leve l, crime and safety, costs o f producti on inputs (labor, 
util ities, and raw material s), nati ona l and local taxes as criti cal facto rs. 
A.T. Keamey through the Global Business Po licy Council ann ually conducts FDI 
Confidence Index surveys of CEOs, CFOs and other top decision-makers of the 
world 's largest 1000 MNEs about their opinions on various issues relating to FDI 
destinations and investment inten tions (A.T. Keamey, 2004). T hese fi mls are 
responsib le for 70 percent of the global FDI fl ows in 65 countri es which receive 
more than 90 percent of the global FDI flows. 
Table 5: Attracti veness of factors to MNEs fo r FDI locations in China and Indi a 
(P f d ) ercent 0 respon en Is 
Factors China Indi a 
Market size 94 6 
Market growth potentia l 78 22 
Access to export market 71 29 
Govemment incentives 66 34 
Labor/production costs 65 35 
Infrastructure 64 36 
Economic/financial stabi lity 6 1 39 
Economic refoml 60 40 
Quality of life 59 41 
Political/social stabi lity 59 41 
Tax regime 58 42 
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Competitor presence 55 45 
Consumer sophistication 54 46 
Availability ofM&A targets 50 50 
Regulatory environment 43 57 
Cultural barriers 34 66 
Transparency 30 70 
Rule of law 27 73 
Managerial talent 27 73 
Highl y educated workforce 22 78 
Source: Adapted from A.T. Kearney (2004): FDf Confidence Index. Global BusJIl ess 
Policy Counci l, Alexandria, Virginia, USA. 
The FDr Confidence lndex Report did not specify location factors MNEs would 
consider favo rab le. However, the report showed the fac tors that MNEs li ke in China 
and lndia, which made these countries as the world' s first and third most attractive 
FDI locat ions (A.T. Kearney, 2004) . 
Table 6: Critical Corporate Ri sks Perceived by MNEs in FDI 
(P f d) ercent 0 respon ents 




Government regulations/legal decisions 64 Down 72 
Country financial risk 60 Down 67 
Currencylinterest rate volatility 51 Down 63 
Political and social disturbances 46 Down 62 
Absence of rule of law 29 Down 34 
Corporate governance issues 30 Up 25 
Emerging Risks: 
Theft of intellectual property 28 Up 17 
Terrorist attack 26 Up 21 
Security threat to personnel/assets 26 Up 22 
Product quality/safety 20 Up 19 
IT di sruption 19 Up 17 
Employee fraud or sabotage 10 Up 8 
Source: Adapted from AT Kearney (2004): FDr Confidence lndex . Global Busilless 
Policy Council , Alexandria, Virginia, USA. 
The factors li sted by the MNEs surpri singly fall in line with the findings of the 
econometl;c studies. The most interesting aspect appears to be that the attracti ve 
factors in China and India are diametrically opposite. It is because the global 
investors view both countries to have distinctly different markets and production 
sectors. China is the leading manufacturer of industrial products and has a fast 
growing consumer market, while India is a leading provider of IT services and has 
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growing future market potent ia l. Still, both countri es show factors which are 
attractive to the MNEs. 
The MNEs identified the ri sk factors that they consider criti cal dec ision-making 
issues for investing in a country. They consider government regulations/legal 
decisions, social and politica l disturbances, and absence of ru le of law to be the most 
important among the trad itional ri sks. Financial condition and exchange rate 
vo latility are also important. However, they fin d conditi ons of trad itional ri sks are 
improving over the years, while new kinds of ri sks e.g. violation of intellectual 
property rights, terrorism and security threats, employee fraud, product safety, are 
emerging. All together, they point at the sign ificant ro le of the government and 
perfOl1l1anCe of govel1lance as critica l to fore ign investment dec isions. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS: 
Developing countries are vying fo r private investments, but a lthough foreign direct 
investments have risen phenomenally over the years, most of it went to the 
developed countries. Mu ltinational companies fee l more secure and less risk fo r their 
investments in the deve loped countri es and they are more attracted to the favo rable 
factors existing there fo r FDI locations. To inOuence MNE's dec isions on FDl 
location, the developing countries would have to understand and prov ide attractive 
features to the MNEs. 
The literatu re review for the theory of FDl reveals several strands of approaches 
based on international trade and industri al organization theori es, but none seems to 
have been able to provide any complete explanation and understanding of the FDI 
phenomenon acceptable to the researchers. Theoreti ca l lapses crept into diverse 
empirical studies leading to ' measurement without theory' . It was Durming's ec lectic 
paradigm on ownership, location, and internalization advantages brought the 
theoretical strands together and gave certain meaningfu l understanding of the FDI 
behavior. Nonetheless, Dunning's eclectic paradigm concel1ls more about the 
supply-side of FOr, explaining the fi rm 's reasoning for becoming multinational and 
investing abroad. Selection of FOr location was explored in the ex tension of the 
paradigm in which the location decision depended on the intent ion of the MNE 
whether it was market-seeking, resource-seeking, or effi ciency-seeki ng. The 
demand-side characterist ics of the host countri es were taken into account by the 
MNEs for matching with the supply-side dec isions on FDllocation. 
In the confusion of theoret ical lapse a vast number of econometric studies came to 
fi ll the gap in the literature that are essentially ' measurement ,,·ithout theory'. Their 
fi ndings were mixed, and sometimes conOicted with each other" s findings. Yet from 
the various econometric studies and MNE surveys a number of important location 
factors have come to light. 
First of all , economic fundamental s of the host country are found to be the most 
important determinants ofFDllocation, even though there are mixed views about the 
ESS Working Paper 06 26 
• 
Demand-side Location Determinants for Attracting FD! 
signifi cance and robustness of the individual detenninants. The less controversial 
location factors for market-seeking FOIs are market size, market growth, and market 
access. For export-seeking or resource-seeking FOls the attractive factors are labor 
cost and costs of inputs. Infrastructure is an important attractive factor to both types 
of FD ls. Surprisingly tax, tariff, and govenunent incentives, though found to be 
important, are not cruc ial deteI1l1inants for attracting FOI location. It is not because 
the MNEs are not interested in the government incenti ves, but they feel that these are 
short term factors that the govenunent can quickl y change the incenti\'es thus 
affecting their investments either favorab ly or unfavorab ly. As such government 
incentives should not be the criteria for basing location decisions. MNEs are more 
concerned with long term government rules and regulations. 
There is considerable disagreement existing in the literature about the effec ts of 
socio-po litical instability and corruption factors on the MNE' s FOl location 
decisions. Econometric studies provide mixed results- some find negati ve effects. 
others find insignifi cant rel ationships between soc io-politica l stability and FD I 
inflows. However, opinion surveys reveal concerns of the MNEs about political 
instab ility and soc ial unrests. 
Host country attractiveness to FOI location does not depend on one or few 
determ inants alone. On the other hand, all the des irable factors may not be present in 
a country. The MNEs take into consideration various demand-side factors 
cumulatively including business outlook, intra- and inter-countly trade Issues. 
national and international trade polices for dec iding about their FDllocation . 
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